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ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR ELECTRONIC
TEXTS: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR
PATTERSON AND JUDGE BIRCH
Douglas Y'Barbo*
Astronauts in the weightlessness of pixelated space
Exchange graffiti with a disembodied race
-Neil Peart, Virtuality
I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to respond to a recent article by
Professor L. Ray Patterson and Circuit Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr.
entitled Copyright and Free Speech Rights, published in a prior
issue of this Journal.1 Professor Patterson and Judge Birch ("the
Authors") have written a thoughtful article obviously worthy of
reflection. Indeed, the provocative view taken by the Authors I
suspect will become mainstream copyright law in the near future.
At the highest meaningful level of abstraction, the Authors call for
immunity against certain types of copying of protected works on
First Amendment grounds. The Authors do not divulge their thesis
right away; indeed, identifying the Authors' thesis takes some
work.
II. IDENTIFYING THE AUTHORS' THESIS
A.

COPYRIGHT LAW VERSUS THE FIRST AMENDMENT?

Immediately upon reading the article's title, one wonders why, in
1997, someone-let alone a noted copyright scholar and a highly
regarded jurist-would be interested in revisiting a topic long ago
resolved, namely the conflict between Copyright and Free Speech.
* Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Houston, Texas; J.D., University of Chicago; M.S.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The author's e-mail address is
dybarbo@fulbright.com. I am grateful for the excellent editorial assistance of Carol Hewey.
, L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Copyrightand Free Speech Rights, 4 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (1996).
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For instance, from the Supreme Court a little over a decade ago:
"In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that
the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas."2 And from Professor Goldstein just a few years
ago: "[Compulsory licenses, fair use, and the idea/expression
dichotomy] have buffered copyright from charges that it violates the
First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and press."'
The Authors claim that the First Amendment is not a regular
part of copyright discourse. I am not convinced that it should be.
Surely we should not require a judge to account for every contiguous legal regime that nominally implicates copyright law. First
Amendment protections, as we shall see, are already embedded in
contemporary copyright law. Therefore, we need not revisit them
ab initio each time a copyright case is decided. Copyright law, left
to its own devices, would not, I suspect, ultimately decay into a
regime of absolute protection for original works of authorship.
Indeed, copyright contains its own iterative mechanism. In other
words, the legal rule that authors would prefer ex ante is not
necessarily stronger protection; stronger protection increases the
cost of access which in turn raises the cost to authors of creating
new works. I shall illustrate this in the brief digression that
follows.
B.

BRIEF DIGRESSION I: TWO COMPETING PARADIGMS

In brief, I believe the Authors misstate entirely the core dilemma;
the balance that copyright law must strike is not between authors
and the public-to whom the First Amendment is directed-but
between existing authors and future authors. The public, though
properly excluded from any equation to determine the preferred
degree of protection, is better off regardless of where the line is
drawn that depicts the breadth of the author's exclusive rights.

'Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,558,225 U.S.P.Q. 1073, 1080
(1985).
3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM

GUTENBERG To THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 21 (1994).
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Between a world with no protection for creative texts and one with
protection (either in the form of monopoly protection or direct
subsidy), the public is unquestionably better off in the latter. This
requires some explanation.
There are two distinct rationales to justify protecting an author's
works by means of a property right.4 These two rationales are
used to justify the view that the only legitimate goal of intellectual
property law is to calibrate the incentive benefits of legal protection
against the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing versus the polar
view that ownership of rights in one's creative works are analogous
to rights of the person, and therefore resistant to sterile economic
analysis, which might permit intrusion upon those rights if the
author suffers no direct economic harm.
The first of these two rationales is the romantic vision of the
independent creative genius, perhaps grounded in natural law,
though its etiology is probably more complicated than that.' This
view compels the conclusion that an author has a property right in
what he created just as if it were a parcel of land (though not of
course necessarily in the physical article, but in the intangible
expression). By contrast, the second view is that copyright is
merely an instrument of public policy designed to encourage the
creation of original works of authorship. It is alternatively known
as the "instrumentalist" justification or the ex ante perspective.
The latter rationale would support an easement across another's
property if it did not harm the property, the former, perhaps not.
Obviously, the scope of copyright protection is broader under the
first rationale than under the second. Under the second, the
infringement standard is calibrated roughly according to the
economic incentives needed to encourage the author to create the
work. More precisely: beginning with no protection whatever,
what is the point where if the last increment of protectability was
removed, the author's incentives to create the work would be
quashed, or at least seriously diminished?
Which of these two competing rationales of copyright is embodied
in modern copyright law? No doubt it is infused with both. And

' These two competing rationales are examined together in several works. See, e.g.,
Goldstein, supra note 3, at 15; MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT 140 (1993).
" See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 224 (KB. 1769).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

3

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4

198

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 5:195

the dominance of one over the other perhaps depends upon the
subject matter, more than anything else. For instance, the
infringement standard by which databases and factual compilations
are judged reflects a hard-edged reality of minimal, incremental
creativity driven only by the prospect of commercial gain. Economics, rather than aesthetics, controls this domain: the infringement
standard is mechanically applied and looks only toward what the
accused infringer took. By contrast, the infringement standard
applied to literary works is premised on the notion of preserving
the original author's aesthetic appeal, which innervates the entire
work, rather than being embodied in one particular element or
another. Hence, the infringement standard asks whether an
"ordinary observer," after a leisurely-rather than critical-reading
of both works would regard their aesthetic appeal the same. The
standard applied to literary works seems to appreciate the
work-or some ephemeral part of it anyway-as the author's
personal property. On the other hand, the database standard
seems to reflect not only an indifference towards the author, but
also a recognition that the creation of original (hence useful)
products must not be discouraged by permitting unrestricted
copying.
Moreover, the particular commercial setting may favor one
justification over the other. For instance, the difficulty with
calibrating an infringement standard on economic incentives is that
the threshold point varies drastically according to medium and
industry. Indeed, in many industries, there is arguably little need
for copyright protection to compel vigorous creation of original
works of authorship, which of course, is an argument for narrow
protection. For instance, in the software industry-an industry in
which new products quickly become technically obsolete-the lead
time advantage enjoyed by the first entrant may be sufficient
incentive. Infringement of scholarly writing (by other scholars) is
enforced, no doubt, by numerous professional and quasi-professional bodies whose sanctions can be far more severe than an infringement verdict in the courts. According to one commentator:
"Plagiarism is an academic capital offense, punishable by academic
death for students or faculty."' Similarly, the film industry has a

6 IR.

ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 39 (1988).
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strict code which discourages stealing ideas from others in the
industry.7
The romantic conception, in contrast to the instrumentalist
justification, unfortunately suggests no reliable endpoint to
measure the proper level of protection, short of an absolute
proscription of copying in any manner. Thus, the instrumentalist
justification generally supports an infringement standard more
tolerant of copying than the romantic justification. And yet, a
higher level of copyright protection rarely benefits the author who
pays for that higher level of protection ex post in increased cost of
expression due to restricted access to others' works upon which he
must necessarily draw. Therefore, an author somehow benefits no
matter where the line is drawn, so long as it is clearly drawn.
Hence copyright law must strike a delicate balance between
providing incentives to authors in the form of legal protection
against copying their works and not squelching those incentives by
so raising the level of protection that future authors may not draw
freely upon the stock of prior works without fear of infringement.
Hence, the balance is between ex ante authors on one end and ex
post authors on the other: the same author who is denied protectability of the ideas contained in his novel against an accused
infringer, benefits ex post because he can borrow other authors'
ideas freely when creating his next work. Thus, his incentives to
create, though diminished by the narrow scope of protection in his
own works, is revived by a reduced cost of expression, or cost of
creating subsequent works, since he can borrow liberally from other
works without fear of infringing or obtaining a license. It is rare
that the same group is being balanced at both ends by the rule,
often a legal rule balances the interests of two different groups
such as debtors and creditors, common carriers and passengers,
businesses and consumers, or public corporations and private
investors. The significance of this astonishingly simple paradigm
is that beyond a certain point, increased copyright protection will
actually decrease authors' incentives to create new works, because
curtailing access to the stock of available material raises their cost
of expression.'

7 See ROBERT KOSBERG, How TO SELL YOUR IDEA TO HOLLYWOOD 178 (1991).

a Thus, at least in copyright law anyway, the tension over where to draw the line
separating protectable from unprotectable matter is largely overstated. Indeed, I see it as
a pointless exercise. Shifting the standard in either direction simultaneously benefits
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So, when viewed ex ante, authors as an entire group, are by and
large indifferent to the scope of protection afforded their works. Of
course most authors and artists would disagree because they want
the best of both worlds. Whether an artist becomes incensed when
he or she finds out that a work is a substantial copy from a prior
work does not infringe, depends, for instance, upon whether the
artist is a rocker or a rapper,9 a celebrity author or biographer,"0
or a postmodern artist or impressionist.1 1 My point is: clearly
some authors and artists are net borrowers, while others are net
contributors. In this section and in this Article, I am speaking
generally. In an ideal world, legal protection in the form of
copyright would be carefully titrated so that the level of protection
exactly matches the point where one less unit of protection would
substantially diminish the author's incentives to create the works.
In other words, no more legal protection is given the author than
is necessary. At least if one accepts the instrumentalist justification of copyright over the romantic conception, then copyright is not
about helping the copyright owner squeeze every last dime out of
his property right. Instead, it is about carefully calibrating the
level of protection based on the necessary incentives required to

(viewed ex ante) and harms (viewed ex post) authors. So, within broad boundaries, there
exists a spectrum of "correct" standards, beyond that, determining the scope of protection is
a pure policy decision, not a legal or intellectual one. But although it is a policy decision, one
should not expect it to be made by policy makers (i.e., legislators). That is because
calibrating the desired scope of protection is confounded by the heterogeneity in the types
of works (novels, movies, biography, sculptures, stuffed animals, and so on) and the types
of industry within which the works are created and disseminated. Hence, the legal rule
would have to take the form of highly-specific regulations directed to one work or industry
at a time. This also implies that the rule may vary from medium to medium (e.g., one for
computer software, another for literary works, and so on).
" See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (1994)
(holding that commercial character of song parody by rap group "2 Live Crew" of Roy
Orbison's hit song "Oh Pretty Woman" did not create a presumption against fair use).
1 See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding defendant Random House was not protected by fair use when publishing a literary
biography of plaintiff J.D. Salinger which included quotations, and paraphrased text from
the letters of Salinger).
" See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1494 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding sculpture created by defendant Koons from a photograph taken by plaintiff was not
protected by the fair use doctrine even though Koons intended the sculpture to be an
accurate depiction of the photograph for purposes of social criticism, in the tradition of Andy
Warhol, Robert Rauschenberg, and David Salle).
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compel the author to create the work. Any additional protection
will diminish the incentives of future authors to create, who must
pay for that increased protection in the form of higher costs of
creation.
Therefore, the author-author tension ensures that
copyright protection is stably constrained, without the need for
explicit consideration of the public interest.
C. CONFLICT
The Authors begin by alerting us to a "conflict" between copyright
law and the First Amendment. Since copyright law grants to
authors a right to exclude others from copying, it is in natural and
obvious conflict with the First Amendment, which regularly
immunizes violations of such restrictions.
Yet despite what the Authors may say, there is nothing unusual,
nor even interesting about a "conflict" between two different laws;
that laws conflict is certainly not a penetrating insight. Indeed,
copyright law conflicts with just about every other law with which
it comes in contact. For example, copyright law conflicts with state
uniform commercial codes on the issue of how to properly perfect
a copyright as a security interest for loan collateral.1 2 It also
conflicts with contemporary estates laws. 3 And, copyright law
also naturally conflicts with state and federal antitrust laws.
The fact is, both the guarantee of protected speech and a
government-backed monopoly for original works of authorship
derive from separate constitutional provisions. The majority view
is, as Justice O'Connor made very clear in Harper& Rowe, that the
two regimes exist in taught juxtaposition, despite their apparent
opposing purposes.1 4
D. THE AUTHORS' REAL THESIS

Professor Patterson and Judge Birch must have had something
else in mind in writing their article if their purpose was not merely
'Alice Haemmerli, InsecurityInterests: Where IntellectualPropertyand CommercialLaw
Collide, 96 CoLuM. L. REv. 1645, 1650 (1996).
13 Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between
Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL PROP. L. 163 (1997).

14See Harper& Rowe, 471 U.S. at 559.
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to identify a long-resolved conflict. Indeed they did. What I have
identified as the real thesis of their article is this: due to advances
in technology, the way in which people obtain access to copyrighted
works has changed due, in turn, to the way in which authors/copyright owners make their protected works available to the
public. Whereas before, Patterson and Birch argue, an author 5
would sell copies of his work, today he sells access via an on-line
provider. In other words, digital storage and transmission is
rapidly replacing hard-copy publishing. Patterson and Birch's point
is that the Free Speech Clause subsumes a right of access, which
was never a problem until access became the very thing being sold,
which means withholding access from the public until purchased.
To be more specific, simply reading a book borrowed from the
public library is not infringement, nor has it ever been. Section 106
of the Copyright Statute lists the exclusive rights granted to the
author, and the exclusive right to "use" is not one of them."6 So
we know that the copyright law at least provides a minimum right
of access or a right to use, if only implicitly. Yet, technically
speaking, "pulling up" an electronically recorded document on a
computer is more than just use; it is actually making a "copy" of
the work, which is an infringement. The Authors argue, since
access cannot occur without infringement, digital storage and
transmission technology has foreclosed this important right by
making mere access ("use") an infringing act. Therefore, they
argue, the First Amendment's guarantee of a public right to hear
is violated. 7 This is a fair point.
Next, the Authors state that the First Amendment must be
invoked to mitigate this obvious censorship caused by the copyright
protection of creative works transmitted and stored by electronic
media. Finally, the Authors suggest, without offering any evidence

1 Hereafter, I shall use the term "author" to refer to the actual copyright owner or

licensee (quite often the publisher).
16 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996).
17 Actually what Patterson and Birch say is that the First Amendment embodies
a "light

to learn." They offer no support for this formulation, though my own research suggests that
this is reasonably close. Years ago, the late Professor Meiklejohn argued that the First
Amendment defines a "community right to hear" rather than an individual right to hear.
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM: CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
26-28 (1965).
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to corroborate their thesis, that copyright's overreaching in these
instances is due to its misconception as a property right, when
instead, the real focus should be on merely protecting the author
from market harm.

In summary, according to Professor Patterson and Judge Birch:
(1) copyrighted texts stored and transmitted by electronic media are
overprotected by copyright since mere use or access cannot occur
without copying the work, which is an infringing act; (2) the First
Amendment must be invoked to constrain copyright's reach in this
instance; and (3) the problem is due, in the first instance, to the
misconception of copyright as a property right. I shall address
these in turn, but before I do, I want to point to a crucial assumption unstated in the Authors' work, that the effect of infringement
is to expose protected works to a larger audience. In the short run
this is certainly true, though for how long it will hold is another
matter. Diminished protection for creative works will inevitably
curtail their creation, which no one seriously doubts."8
E. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Ultimately what is motivating the Authors is their perception
that copyright law has undergone a "major transformation in terms
of its function that alters its purpose."19 As evidence of this
transformation, they point to the emergence of legal fictions (e.g.,
the author's employer becomes the author in certain instances; a
radio transmission becomes a statutory "writing;" and a mere
"compilation" of previously copyrighted materials is eligible for
copyright protection). These fictions, the Authors argue, have
actually frustrated the purpose of copyright law, which the Authors
identify as the public's right to learn. I disagree. I disagree that
these fictions have frustrated the purpose of copyright law, and I
disagree that the purpose of copyright is to protect the public's
right to learn. Below, I shall discuss each of these "fictions."
's Notwithstanding the occasional effort to prove otherwise, see, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). Copyright results in a net increase in creative
output; therefore, how is it possible that copyright can have a net "adverse... impact on the
right of the people to know"? Patterson & Birch, supra note 1, at 3.
1Patterson & Birch, supra note 1, at 12.
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First, the purpose of a copyright is to encourage the creation of
original works of authorship. Thus, the law functions most
efficiently by identifying those actors who best respond to the
incentives provided by copyright law. Sometimes that is the
creator herself, sometimes it is her employer. For instance, if
copyright law forbids the creator to transfer ownership of the
copyright to the employer (e.g., publisher), the result-far from
protecting the creator-would instead be diminished pecuniary
award to the creator.
Second, subsuming radio transmissions under the rubric of a
"writing" merely enables the copyright law to protect a radio
broadcast, which often never appears in any more tangible form.
Thus a radio broadcast is subsumed within the definition of a
writing, rather than separate provisions, (e.g., on executive rights,
infringement, etc.) in the code relating to radio broadcasts.
Third, and most importantly, the Authors are horrified that
copyright law is responsible for removing texts from the public
domain. Again, I strongly disagree with this assertion, though the
Authors are not the only ones to express this view.20
Suppose an author creates a database of all intellectual property
lawyers in Houston, Texas, separated by specialty, and cross
referenced by firm. Included under each listing, along with the
perfunctory biographical information are: reported cases tried by
that lawyer, clients represented, and publications authored by that
lawyer. Obviously, all of this information, separately, exists in the
public domain. Indeed, I could probably compile such a database
sitting in my office right now, using only a name directory of all
Houston lawyers, and the electronic resources available on the
Internet and WESTLAW. Yet an author could certainly obtain
copyright protection for such a database. 21 Next, suppose the
2 This fear has been expressed elsewhere. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE,
AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 209 n.8 (1996).

21 This work would be protectable as a "compilation" which is defined in the Copyright
Code as a "work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Section 103(b) states
that, "[t]he copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material."
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
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author makes the database available electronically (which is likely
since it would need to be updated frequently) via the Internet, and
he charges a fee to obtain a password to access the database. This
is the informational holocaust with which Patterson and Birch are
so concerned. But what has the author removed from the public
domain? Nothing. A copyright has a scope, and either a particular
element comprising the text lies within the scope or it does not.2 2
All of the original sources freely available to him that he used to
compile the database are still available to everyone, just as they
were before the author prepared the database. All that has
changed is that now the public has the option of obtaining the
information piecemeal from a variety of public domain sources, or
to pay a fee and get the information more conveniently from a
single source. Nothing has been removed from the public domain.
Consider another example. Several years ago, the film Driving
Miss Daisy ("DMD") was released to the public and received critical
as well as popular acclaim. As the reader may recall, this movie
told the story of an elderly white jewish person who, faced with
advancing age and the consequent loss of independence, must enlist
the assistance of a black helper (chauffeur). The relationship is
initially tenuous, strained by the master's deeply held attitudes and
beliefs toward both race and social class. Yet the relationship
undergoes a metamorphosis from a purely employer-employee one
to a devoted friendship, thereby depicting the erosion of firmly
entrenched racial barriers, an erosion that occurs largely through
the patient mentorship of the servant towards the master. My
point is this: DMD is certainly "original" in the literary sense,
though it is really no different from the Authors' (and my) database
example. In other words, this work-like every other literary work
ever created-is comprised of elements that the author contributed
himself, and those that he borrowed from the works of others. For
instance, the particular master/servant theme is perhaps the
essence of this work, i.e., the element that gives DMD its aesthetic
appeal-and yet it is hardly original. Indeed, this theme has a
venerable literary tradition, from which DMD's author liberally

22 See, e.g., Douglas Y'Barbo, On Section 411 of the Copyright Code and Determiningthe
ProperScope of a Copyright Registration, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 345 (1997) (providing
a workable definition of "scope").
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borrowed. This theme has been refined through such literary
masterpieces as Cervantes' Don Quixote, Twain's HuckleberryFinn,
Smollett's Roderick Random, Fielding's Joseph Andrews, Diderot's
Jacques the Fatalist,and Dickens' Pickwick Papers. More specifically, elements from each of these works can be found in DMD. For
instance, the transformation of the formal employer-employee
relationship into a genuine friendship (i.e., the dissolution of the
master/servant relationship) and the quasi-paternalistic tenor of
the relationship (servant towards the master) which comprise a
large part of the aesthetic appeal in DMD, are also major themes
in The Pickwick Papers, and Huckleberry Finn. Nor is the treatment in DMD of the servant as a true equal-perhaps even a
superior who educates the master-an original variation of the
master/servant theme, having been previously explored in Jacques
the Fatalist.
So, does DMD remove anything from the public domain? Should
we condemn DMD as an impermissible usurpation of the public
domain-and therefore deny it protection by copyright? According
to the Authors we should.
III. ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND PUBLIC ACCESS
A. BRIEF DIGRESSION II: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE
COPYRIGHT LAW

Before I engage the Authors' thesis, I shall require a second brief
digression. With respect to technological advances and their
potential impact on copyright law, we should be careful not to
overreact. At present, an urgent movement has coalesced to
develop a third intellectual property paradigm to protect nascent
technologies (e.g., Internet-related software, artificial intelligencerelated systems) thought to be insufficiently protected by current
regimes.' For instance, prior to 1971, record manufacturers were
forced to rely upon state misappropriation law to protect sound
recordings; then in 1971, Congress passed the Sound Recordings

"See Symposium Toward a Third IntellectualProperty Paradigm,94 CoLUM. L. REV.
2307 (1994) (discussing the need for stronger legal protection in this field, as well as
providing proposals for such protection).
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Amendment to the Copyright Code.2 4 This perceived need, of
course, implies a failure or inability of copyright and patent law to
adequately protect these technologies, sufficient to encourage the
desired level of investment. I find the current orthodoxy-that a
new paradigm is needed to protect emerging technologies-seriously myopic.'
If we enacted a new intellectual property law every time a new
technology arose, then we would be overrun with them by now.
Indeed, whenever such a new technology arises, Congress or the
Supreme Court (sometimes both) have always provided a timely
response-whether the change has been with respect to photographs, movies, phonographic records, high-speed photocopiers, or
video cassette recorders. When they first appeared, all of these
technologies posed apparently insurmountable difficulties for
certain classes of authors, for which the Copyright Code provided
no relief, and in every case, Congress promptly amended the Code.
For instance, prior to 1865, a photograph was apparently not
protected under the then-current copyright law (because it was not
technically a writing). Therefore, in 1865 Congress amended the
Copyright Act to expressly include photographic prints within its
protectable subject matter.2" The next major technological advance was recorded music. Prior to 1905, the act of making a
recording by, for instance, a piano roll or phonograph did not
appear to infringe the copyright in the musical score. In 1905,
Congress amended the Copyright Act to close that technological
loophole.27 Another example occurred in 1912 when the Supreme
Court first condemned infringement of a motion picture under the
Copyright Code.'
One year later, Congress again amended the

' Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), amended by
Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
2But
see Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275 (1989).
Act of Mar. 3, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (1865) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5)
(1994)). See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding the
copyrighting of photographs to be constitutional); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (holding that a chromolithograph is protectable under the
copyright law).
27 Act of Mar. 4, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(aX7) (1994)).
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
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Copyright Statute to include movies. 29 The explosive advances in
high-speed photocopying in the 1960s and 1970s created entirely
unforeseen problems, particularly for publishers of scholarly
journals, which the copiers generally claimed was a "fair use." In
response, the 1976 Act included a provision (§ 108) which permits
the owner of the copy to make a single additional copy.'
The
increased use of home videotaping machines (VCRs) led to a similar
problem-private viewers could tape an entire copyrighted
television show and watch it later. Again, the Supreme Court
responded to create a safe harbor for this type of copying ("time
shifting"). 3 1 These few examples should suffice to show that a
technological advance that implicates the copyright law is followed
immediately by a suitable legislative or judicial response.
B. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The reader interested in the problem described in this Article
should be aware of the executive and legislative responses to the
problem. First, in February 1993, President Clinton formed the
Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) to develop and
implement the Administration's vision of the NII, or National
Information Infrastructure. The IITF has three components: the
Telecommunications Policy Committee (TPC), the Common
Application of Technology (CAT), and the Information Policy
Committee (IPC). The IPC in turn formed a group known as the
Intellectual Property Rights Working Group, which was charged
with the formidable task of assessing the adequacy of the Copyright
Act to protect works created, stored, or disseminated in electronic
media. The Group's recommendations were published in September 1995 in "Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights."3 2 This report is more commonly known as the

- Act of Aug. 24, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (1912) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(aX6) (1994)).
17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1994).
"Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
665 (1984).
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (visited Feb. 19, 1997)
<http'//www.ladas.com/NI/>.
'o
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"NII White Paper" or just "White Paper." Overall, the White Paper
recommended only modest changes to the copyright law.' Identical bills were quickly introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch and
Representative Carlos Moorehead, adopting the working group's
recommendations. This legislation called for, among other things,
amending sections 101 (definitions) and 106(3) (enumerating the
exclusive rights) of the Copyright Act to make clear that the right
of public distribution applies to computer network transmission of
copyrighted copies and phonorecords.
C. DOES ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND STORAGE CURTAIL ACCESS
TO COPYRIGHTED WORKS?

Second, what is the net effect of the development of the Internet
on the public's access to copyrighted works? Either the network
transmission and storage results in a net increase in public access
to copyrighted works or it does not.'
"Electronic publishing," from an author/copyright owner's point
of view, is simply an alternative means of disseminating his or her
work. Whether to disseminate it in hard copy or electronically is
driven by two factors: (1) the cost and (2) the target audience. The
first of these is of interest here. Generally speaking, it is far
cheaper to electronically publish than to publish by the usual hard
copy means. Of course, the best way to reach the largest audience
is to exploit both media, though this is often not possible. Recently,
for instance, at least two law schools have decided to publish
student-edited law reviews entirely on-line; no concurrent hardcopies will be printed, which is the very thing that Patterson and
Birch are concerned about.' I have no doubt that cost was the
major issue here, given the shoe-string budgets and small subscription lists of most specialty legal journals. In other words, without
the availability of electronic publishing, these journals would very
likely not exist. So, electronic publishing provides either a medium
in addition to hard copies, in which case there is no issue of
33Id,

"Many commentators see the Internet as a net benefit to public speech. E.g., R. Bruce
Rich, FundamentalFirst Amendment Issues in Relation to On-Line Liability, 11 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 665 (1996).
"The law schools are the University of Michigan and Boston University.
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curtailed access, or an alternative medium. That electronic
publishing is far cheaper than hard copy publishing suggests that
the former was chosen over the latter for this reason, which in turn
suggests that these works would either not exist without electronic
publishing or would not be disseminated at all but for this medium.
Therefore, any suggestion of curtailed access due to electronic
publishing is suspect.
Indeed, almost anyone will tell you that electronic media has
exponentially increased public access to copyrighted works.
Millions of copyrighted documents are made available to the public
through the Internet at no cost. Moreover, a user does not need to
pay an on-line service provider, which is often the most significant
cost to access. He or she can instead rely on a direct connection,
and the cost of direct connections have been dropping rapidly. 6
Currently, there are more than 130 public-access free-nets
around the United States. 37 For instance, residents of Houston,
Texas can now get Internet access absolutely free, and for those
without a computer, the accounts can be used at terminals at area
public libraries." The coalition providing this service, moreover,
now plans to provide graphical Internet accounts to teachers in the
Houston area.39 Across the entire United States, one in four
libraries now offers free on-line services. 40 In addition, the federal
government has ambitious plans to boost that number.4 ' The
Federal Communications Commission announced plans to help set
Internet access at libraries throughout the United
up low-cost
42
States.
Additionally, the majority of the copyrighted works made
available through the Internet are provided to the public with

3 On-line service providers, such as America On-line, for which the user is charged, do
not technically charge for access to the Internet but rather offer such features as indexing,
customer support (i.e., on-line help) and easy-to-use interfaces, which provide quicker access.
7
Dwight Silverman, Houston Group Offers ResidentsFreeInternetAccess, HOUS. CHRON.,
Oct. 4, 1997, at BI.

3

id.

39 id.
' Editorial, Ideasfor our Community Libraries'Online Challenge,ATLANTA CONST., April
7, 1997,
at A6.
41
id.
4 Id.
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Of course, access is restricted to some

works, though these restrictions are the exception and not the rule.
How does this framework compare to Patterson and Birch's
model scenario, which I shall assume is "the public library?"
Anyone who has lived in a large urban area knows that getting to
the public library is a challenge, and though it is nominally "free,"
in reality, it is anything but free: to park and to get a library card
costs about twenty dollars in Chicago, for instance. Once at the
library, the cost of the library card does not include one's copies of
selected pages of the book; if you do photocopy, it costs about ten
cents per page. Add to those costs search time, travel time, and
opportunity costs, and it becomes obvious that public access to
copyrighted works in hard copy is far from free.
I have just discussed the net effect of electronic media on public
access to copyrighted works. The clear consensus is that the result
is an overwhelming increase in access. No one would seriously
doubt this. But suppose this increase in access is not enough for
Patterson and Birch. The Authors may reply that, access aside, a
comparatively small subset of works are available only online and
for a fee. Practically speaking, this is a truly de minimis concern,
as we shall see.
Again, consider all works published in electronic form. Some are
made available free of charge, others are not. Of those works that
are, many, and probably most, are also available in hard-copy form.
Obviously, the only concern of Patterson and Birch is those works
for which no free access is provided and no hard copy was published. The Authors attack the medium as a whole, so I direct my
response to the medium as a whole.
The question becomes, what is the real cost of access to those
works?
I suggest that the cost is very low-indeed near
zero--certainly too low to implicate the First Amendment, or any
other constitutional provision. To see this, consider each work as
having a price for access. The user does not typically pay for access
to each work, even for those works that are not free, but rather is
charged in the form of "service" or "access" fees. I suggest that this

"See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, PuttingCars on the 'InformationSuperhighway": Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLu M. L. REV. 1466, 1476 (1995), and
references cited therein (defining and discussing shareware).
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access fee must be divided by the number of works made available
for this fee-which is staggering-to arrive at the true access cost
per work. Otherwise we cannot assess the true impact of the
medium as a whole on public access. When we do this arithmetic,
we find that the cost of access per work is very near zero.
Still, this seems unsatisfying. The Authors have identified a
deep philosophical problem, one brought on by the inevitable
advance of technology, and one not likely to go away. Therefore, I
am troubled by simply offering a practical answer--one based on
statistics and practical enforcement concerns. Is there a philosophical or jurisprudential answer to Patterson and Birch's claim?
D. ON-LINE ACCESS VERSUS INFRINGING BY COPYING

A crucial assumption to the Authors' thesis is that mere access
to copyrighted works is infringement." They may be correct,
though this assumption is far from trivial. The idea is that viewing
a document or file on a computer's monitor requires downloading
the file in digital form from the computer's RAM, hence, a "copy" of
the document is made.45 Despite earlier decisions to the contrary,
the prevailing view appears to be that copying digital information
into a computer's RAM is "copying" for the purposes of § 106 of the
Copyright Statute." Still, not everyone agrees that this is an
infringing act.47

"For a highly detailed discussion of this issue and related ones, see Fred H. Cate, The
Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1415 (1996); John
Gladstone Mills, Entertainmenton the Internet: First Amendment and CopyrightIssues, 79
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 461, 482 (1997).

"Of course, loading the file onto the computer's hard drive or onto a diskette is also
"copying". In fact, many personal computers allow the user to apportion some of the hard
drive's space to act as a "RAM cache," thus effectively increasing the amount of RAM, and
hence retrieval speed. This feature, of course, only strengthens the argument that RAM
copies are infringing copies.
" See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1458, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a RAM copy is an infringing copy); MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.08A[1], at 8-113-115 (1997); CONTU

Report at 13. But see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243
n.3, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 126 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) ("In contrast to the permanent memory
devices a RAM (Random Access Memory) is a chip on which volatile internal memory is
stored which is erased when the computer's power is turned off.*).
' See Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 1476-79; David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles:
The Case of the Evanescent Copy, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 103; Pamela Samuelson, The NII
Intellectual PropertyReport, COMMS. ACM, Dec. 1, 1994, at 21.
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The Copyright Code does not proscribe use; for example, reading
a book is not infringing it: the copyright law excludes, based upon
the list of exclusive rights granted to the author, mere "use." The
Authors know this; indeed, it is for this reason that they claim
electronic storage and transmission media (versus hard-copy
publishing) raise First Amendment concerns, because mere use (for
example, making an ephemeral copy in the computer's RAM) now
becomes infringement. Put another way, there is no way to use a
digitally stored text without infringing it.
The omission of "use" from the list of infringing acts can be read
as implying a right under the copyright law to public access of
copyrighted works. Yet, in some instances, this mere use/access
may conflict with an author's exclusive right. I suspect this is the
"conflict" that the Authors actually had in mind, and indeed it is a
genuine one. The question is then, do we continue to allow
use-though it encroaches on the copyright owner's exclusive
rights-or do we proscribe use in this instance? I suspect, though
I am not sure, the answer is yes to the former. This is the same
answer that the Authors give-though we do not need to invoke the
First Amendment to justify this result. More precisely, the
argument that the Copyright Statute unambiguously provides an
absolute right of access to copyrighted works is persuasive, or at
least appealing. A right that cannot be usurped by technology.
And according to this argument, authors who choose to commercially exploit their works over a different medium in which mere use
conflicts with an infringing act, must also make another choice: to
either refrain from publishing their work in that medium or license
nominal access to the public.
In this next section, I shall discuss why I believe the problem the
Authors have identified is particularly difficult to resolve. By this
I mean that we should be skeptical of the trivial justification
offered by the Authors: merely permitting the RAM copy because
the market impact is negligible.
E.

CONSUMER ACCESS VERSUS COMPETITOR ACCESS

The Authors also try to justify private copying by distinguishing
it from normal commercial exploitation of the work. This consumer/competitor distinction is absurd. For one thing, what good is
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healthy competition if there is no demand for the market's
goods/services? And for another, the traditional justifications, upon
which the Authors implicitly rely for invoking fair use against
private copying, may not apply in the cyberspace setting.
First, private copying has traditionally been justified on the
ground that enforcement is too impractical; hence the copyright
owner has impliedly licensed the work for private copying. The end
users are too numerous, too disperse, and too difficult to identify,
to efficiently sue. Of course, this argument in favor of a private
copying exception has been largely discredited by law and economics scholars who argue that immunizing private use under these
instances discourages the creation of collective licensing societies,
such as ASCAP, BMI, and the Copyright Clearance Center.' The
essential purpose of these societies is to reduce transaction costs
between the copyright owner and the millions of copiers. This
solves the problem from both ends. For the user, one license allows
the user to copy all works covered by the blanket license without
negotiating separately with each author. And for the copyright
owner, license revenues are pooled to create an effective enforcement mechanism.
Second, p ivate copying is often justified on the ground that it is
economically insignificant. In some settings this view is correct.
For instance, a large bookstore certainly competes with public
libraries, since a potential customer can go to the library, read the
book, and photocopy a few important sections of it at a very low
cost. But overall, economic harm from this source is negligible, and
therefore publishers are more or less indifferent to private copying.
Now imagine a different setting: the Internet. The difference here
is that there is no bookseller or middleman between the publisher
and the reader; all "customers" are identical, whether they are
private copiers or large commercial organizations. Put another
way, the development of the Internet, as a viable commercial
means, allows copyright owners to market directly to the end user.
This type of commercial setting destroys the "economic insignificance" justification, because the private copier can no longer argue
that he or she is copying the work outside the normal mode of
commercial exploitation.4 9

" See, e.g., Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performance Rights in Music and
Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 332 (1986).
49 Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 1477-78.
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F. THE DYSON HYPOTHESIS

If the Authors see the increasing digitization of works of
authorship as a threat to the public-which on balance, as I have
argued, it is not-an equally serious countervailing threat to
authors also arises. More specifically, Ester Dyson, celebrated
computer guru, has offered an intriguing hypothesis to predict the
effect of a cyber-society on the value of intellectual property.'
Dyson postulates that as copyright owners try to reach more and
more customers, price per work will approach zero. Yet Dyson is
not arguing that intellectual property should be free; only that it
will be, or nearly so. The implication is obvious: to maintain the
desired level of creation, incentives must increase (either in the
form of direct subsidy or through the prospect of monopoly
protection by copyright). It would be an odd place to start by doing
just the opposite, as the Authors would have us do.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE
A. THE PROBLEM WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment by itself does not provide workable
answers to problems arising in copyright law.51 I do not disagree
that reference to the First Amendment points us in the right
direction-that is, that the RAM copy must be permitted so that
mere use is not infringing in this instance. But the problem is that
the First Amendment provides no constraint upon its own construction., i.e., how far do we go? The First Amendment has nothing to
say about this question. Should the reading public be able to
download a copy on diskette (suppose they cannot afford Internet
"oSee generally ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0: A DESIGN FOR LIVING IN THE DIGITAL AGE

(1997); Esther Dyson, Release 1.0 <http'//www.edventure.com/release/1294.html> (setting
forth Ms. Dyson's views piecemeal).
5
What about the author's rights--not just his rights to collect a monopoly profit, but his
rights under the First Amendment? A bedrock principle of First Amendment law is that it
protects the right not to speak, as well as the right to speak. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elecs.
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,342 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 214 (1984)).
Would not a legal rule that compels disclosure to the public of the author's works violate her
First Amendment rights?

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4

216

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 5:195

access at home and on-line access is limited at the public facility)?
Should they be able to print out a hard copy? Apparently the First
* Amendment would permit all of these activities-or at least a legal
rule permitting these activities is not contrary to the First Amendment.
B. THE COPYRIGHT SCHOLARS' VIEW

The traditional rejoinder-from the copyright scholars' to the
First Amendment scholars' concerns over the conflict with copyright-is that copyright is reconciled with the First Amendment
through a number of limiting doctrines. These are: (1) infringement requires actual copying, thus independent creation destroys
a copyright plaintiffs primafacie case; (2) distinguishing ownership
of the copyright over ownership of the physical article, thus the
copyright owner has no control over the physical article once it
enters the stream of commerce; (3) the fair use doctrine; and (4) the
idea/expression dichotomy. The fourth is by far the most important. In essence, this doctrine proscribes copyright protection
beyond a certain level of abstraction. Hence, in the case of fiction
works, elements like plot, theme, and style are not protectable,
while dialogue (or the literal prose) is protectable. Thus, the
idea/expression doctrine helps the copyright law avoid direct
conflict with the First Amendment by immunizing a subsequent
work which embodies the same "ideas" presented in the prior
work.5 2 Consider, for instance, Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp.

" Numerous justifications have been offered in support of the idea/expression dichotomy.
Richard Posner and William Landes have shown, by a formal model, that protecting ideas

would result in a net decrease in creative output because authors' cost of expression would
increase. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 347-48 (1989). They also suggest that it is Pareto Optimal: it is the
rule that authors would prefer ex ante. I& at 348-40. Another explanation is that the cost
of "discovering" new ideas is low compared to creating expression, hence ideas need not be
protected to compel their creation. Likewise, the high administrative cost of protecting ideas

is no doubt important; it is simply too difficult to determine an idea's source, e.g., whether
it is original or not. The "merger" and "scenes-a-faire"doctrines are closely related to the
idea/expression doctrine. The former is a frequently invoked doctrine in copyright law,
generally subsumed under the idea/expression concept and which refers to instances where
there are a very limited number of ways to express the idea. When that occurs, the merger
doctrine will often be invoked to render the expression unprotectable. The Third Circuit
noted "[An expression will be found to be merged into an idea when 'there are no or few
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v. Kalpakian," a case involving a pin in the shape of a bee,
intended to be worn on a jacket lapel. The Ninth Circuit stated
that:
What is basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner's monopoly-from how large an area of
activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright
owner to exclude others? We think the production of
jeweled bee pins is a larger private preserve than
Congress intended to be set aside in the public
market without a patent. A jeweled bee pin is
therefore an 'idea" that defendants were free to
copy."
V. THE LEGALLY PROTECTED INTEREST CONFERRED BY
THE COPYRIGHT LAW
A. INTRODUCTION

The final point offered in the Authors' work is that copyright is
improperly characterized as a property right, when instead the real
focus should be on market harm. I disagree, but only slightly.

other ways of expressing a particular idea.'" Educ. Testing Serve. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533,
539, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1983)). See also,
id (applying the merger doctrine to deny protection of mathematics questions on college
entrance exams); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kiuwer Law Book Publishers Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1363, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding tables presenting awards in medical malpractice
cases were not copyrightable), Toro Co. v. R&R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212-13, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 282, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1986), (holding that a copyright did not protect a
numbering system for replacement parts); Norton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hosp., 155
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133, 135 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (holding that a system for recording medical
laboratory texts is not clearly uncopyrightable). The scenes-a-faire doctrine is a sweeping
doctrine that is frequently relied upon-indeed over-relied upon in my opinion-in literary
works cases. The way it works is this: since scenes-a-faire is generally defined as stock
scenes that inevitably flow from a particular concept, genre, theme, or other; for instance,
a story about life in a South Bronx police station is likely to feature a hard-drinking and
cynical but dedicated Irish cop, so that particular character, at that level of abstraction is
deemed unprotectable by scenes-a-faire. The reader can of course see that the more broadly
one defines a work's theme, the more expression is subsumed under it.
3446
F.2d 738, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557 (9th Cir. 1971).
"Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
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I believe that the Authors have quite correctly identified
harm as the proper focus of the infringement analysis.
shall provide additional justification and perhaps clarificathe result the Authors' reach.

B. PROPERTY RULES VERSUS LIABILITY RULES

The view taken in this Article is that copyright is best understood-both heuristically and practically-as a property right, at
least if one accepts the orthodox definitions of the term "property."
According to this view, set forth in its original form by Calabresi
and Melamed nearly 30 years ago, the extent and nature of the
transaction costs in a particular case dictates whether one of the
parties to a Coasian bargain ought to have an absolute property
right (injunction) or simply a right to collect damages.55 More
specifically, property rules are more appropriate when few parties
are involved, when valuation of the harm is difficult, and when all
other transaction costs between the parties are low. The clear
consensus is that intellectual property regimes are best protected
at least in part by property rules-as indeed they are."
And yet the difference may be overstated. More recent scholarship, most notably by Professor Polinsky, suggests that the real
difference between property rules and liability rules is quite often
insignificant.57 Copyrights are in fact protected by a combination
of property rules and liability rules: injunctions are usually
ordered when requested by the prevailing copyright owner,' yet
pure money damages are available in addition.59 Finally, the
availability of statutory damages-which the plaintiff may elect in
the event that he is unable to quantify his actual harm-suggests
a recognition of the difficult valuations inherent in copyright
infringement and therefore evidences a slight bias towards property
rules.
m Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
5Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.

REV. 2655, 2664 (1994).
"7A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving NuisanceDisputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive
and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (1980).
17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
5 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994).
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C. COPYRIGHT AS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN A LEGALLY PROTECTED
MARKET POSITION

1. Introduction. In this section, I outline my own view of the
legal entitlement conferred by copyright. I shall first state my own
position, followed by a brief summary of the support offered for it;
this will be immediately followed by a more thorough argument.
Like Professor Patterson and Judge Birch, I agree that market
harm is the center of gravity of this legal right. Yet unlike the
Authors, I believe it is a property right, though the discussion
immediately preceding this section suggests that the liability
rule/property rule taxonomy may be more contrived than real. In
summary, I suggest that a copyright is best understood as a
property right in relation to a legally preferred market position.
We know the Copyright Code defines a copyright claim in a text
as though it were property. It expressly enumerates rights over
which the copyright owner has exclusive dominion and later defines
the unauthorized exercise of those rights as "infringement.'m Yet
the real test of whether something-particularly an incorporeal
something-possesses the attributes of property depends upon
whether the property owner has the absolute right to exclude all
others (i.e., is it an enforceable right, and against whom), and
whether the owner has the right to exercise complete control over
his or her property.6 Therefore, a regime based on the grant of
property rights (i.e., exclusive rights to make copies, prepare
derivative works and so forth) should condemn any-or almost
any-unauthorized exercise of those exclusive rights as an improper intrusion upon the copyright owner's property against anyone.
Copyright does not. Moreover, a regime based on the grant of a
property right in a text should of course subsume a mechanism-either through an ex ante registration practice, orjudicially,
as a predicate to the infringement analysis-to determine the
boundaries of that property right in the thing borrowed. Copyright
does not.
60 17 U.S.C.

§§ 106, 501(b) (1994).
" See, e.g., A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 107,113 (A.G.
Guest ed., 1961). Honor6's definition of property consisted of two elements: exclusion and
control.
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Instead, the actual property right that copyright law protects
relates to a narrowly drawn market position. A violation of this
property right is determined by the likelihood of economic harm
evidenced by erosion to that preferred market position. This is
unusually difficult to measure; hence copyright law excuses any
accused text, regardless of similarity with the original text, if the
author of the accused text did not create that text relying upon the
original text. In economic vernacular, the accused infringer is a
"free-rider" if he relied upon the prior text in preparing his own.
If free-riding, or the effect of the copying on the second author's
cost of expression is the primary desideratum in copyright infringement, then one needs a way to identify it. That is what copyright
law's copying/access requirement does. If the defendant derived, or
is likely to have derived his work from the plaintiffs work, then the
probability is greater that he reduced his cost of expression, a cost
differential that he can exploit in the form of lower price approaching marginal cost, to the detriment of the original author who is
unable to match that price and still recoup his own cost of expression.
Conversely, without copying, then regardless of similarity, the
defendant did not take a free ride on the plaintiff's protectable
expression. And yet, free-riding is not, without more, harmful; it
merely reduces the expression costs to the subsequent author. So
if he or she tucks the accused book away in a locked drawer, the
original author is never harmed. All free-riding tells us is whether
the potential for market harm exists. Therefore, if the defendant
did copy from the plaintiffs text, then a further assay is required
to predict probable market harm. The easiest way to do this is to
ask the average consumer whether he would confuse the two works,
led into thinking that the latter is derived from the former. Hence
the ordinary observer test, e.g.: "[tihe lay listener's reaction is
relevant because it gauges the effect of the defendant's work on the
plaintiffs market." 2 Thus, the genuine focus of the copyright
infringement analysis is on the method by which the accused
infringer created/acquired the work, and the effect of the accused
work on the market for the original, rather than on the text copied.
' Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132, 1134
(4th Cir. 1990).
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Therefore, I argue, copyright is better understood as a property
right in relation to a legally structured market position than one in
relation to a text.
What follows is a more thorough discussion in support of the
thesis that copyright is more like a property right in relation to a
legally structured market position than a property right in relation
to a text.
2. Definition of the Property Right. If a copyright were a
property right in relation to the text itself (or more precisely in the
expression embodied in the text itself) then at some point-either
during the registration process, or later during the infringement
analysis, reasonably precise boundaries of the property would have
to be identified -as demonstrated in patent law. For instance,
in patent law, "[blefore analyzing a claim to determine whether
infringement occurs, the court must properly interpret the
claim."' Following this model, the original (hence protectable)
portions of the text would need to be segregated from the rest of
the work, then the former portion assayed through a series of
filters (e.g., scenes-a-faire, idea/expression dichotomy, etc.) to
determine whether the test qualified for protection by copyright.
Of course, this procedure needs to be done because copying from
a prior work is not infringement unless what is borrowed is, among
other things, original. For instance, the theme of a work of fiction
may be original, but is generally regarded by courts as too abstract
to be protectable. Additionally of course, taking the entire sequence
of events from a prior novel is not infringement if the author of
that novel in turn borrowed the story from a newspaper account of
actual events. So if a copyright were a property right in relation to
the text itself, then this type of dissection would occur. Just as in
a suit for trespass upon land, the boundaries of the plaintiffs
property, unless conceded, first need to be determined, so also the
portions of the text that are actually protected by copyright need to
be identified. However, as we shall see, no such prior definition
occurs.
6

Ownership of the copyright should not of course be confused with ownership of the

physical item embodying the protected expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994) ([O]wnership
of a copyright ... is distinct from ownership of any material object.").
"Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1806,
1809 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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The examination of a copyright application, unlike the rigorous
battle to obtain a patent, is virtually pro forma, which means that
the Copyright Office does not really pass on the issue of originality
though it is a requirement for copyrightability. Originality is left
entirely for the courts. Courts are well aware of this, if not its
consequences:
[U]nlike a patent claim, a claim to copyright is not
examined for basic validity before a certificate is
issued."
It is undisputed that the Copyright Office has
neither the facilities nor the authority to rule upon
the factual basis of applications for registration or
renewal, and that where an application is fair upon
its face, the Office cannot refuse to perform the
"ministerial duty" of registration "imposed upon [it]
by the law.""
There is no such [patent type] search or examination
when a copyright is secured. It issues almost automatically
and there is no prior art to contend
67
with.
Hence, not only is a copyright registered ex parte, but there is
virtually no check on the breadth of the applicant's claim. Even if
that were possible-which it is not-it would still leave the
virtually infinite sea of texts in the public domain. Not surprisingly then, no search is required of the copyright applicant, nor is one
performed by the Copyright Office examiner.
Thus, originality/protectability is not determined during the
registration process. That leaves the matter to the courts-or does

' Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 143, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

812, 824 (D.N.J. 1982) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 157 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C. .N. 5659, 5773).
" Cadence Indus. Corp. v. Ringer, 450 F. Supp. 59, 65-66, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Bouv6 v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 122 F.2d 51, 56, 50
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 338, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
87 Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364,366,96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 13, 14 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
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it? Consider again the Driving Miss Daisy scenario that I introduced earlier.
A few years before, a different author wrote a novel, Horowitz
and Mr. Washington, which also told the story of an elderly white
Jewish person who, faced with advancing age and the consequent
loss of independence, also reluctantly had to enlist the assistance
of a black helper (physical therapist). After the film was released,
the author of Horowitz sued the studio that produced Driving Miss
Daisy, naturally alleging that the latter infringed the copyright in
his novel. The screenwriter of DrivingMiss Daisy conceded that he
had read the play and that he had copied from it. Despite this, the
court, on summary judgment no less, held that DrivingMiss Daisy
did not infringe Horowitz and Mr. Washington."
To arrive at this result, the court did not bother to determine the
protectable scope of Denker's text (i.e., what were the original/copyrightable elements).
The word originality was not
mentioned even once in the Denker opinion. 9 Yet the Denker
court did in fact determine the scope of protection in something, but
it was not the text. Protectable material was not separated from
unprotectable material based on originality; indeed, not a single
prior work was mentioned in the court's opinion.70 Instead of
discussing originality, the court denied protection based on
idea/expression, scenes-a-faire, merger, and extent-of-dissimilarelement grounds.7 1 An' ideal infringement analysis would of
course consider all of the works in defining the scope of Denker's
copyright claim, before deciding infringement. Yet that is obviously
intractable, which explains why it was not done in this case nor is
it ever done in disputes involving literary works, which should
convince the reader that something other than a property right in
relation to a text is being protected by copyright.7"

" Denker v. Uhry, 820 F. Supp. 722, 736, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1756, 1767 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).

sId.
70

Instead, the court relied upon the discrete and comprehensive dissimilarities between

the two works, and to a far lesser extent the idea/expression dichotomy, scenes-a-faire, and
merger doctrines to determine the scope of protection. See id.
71 Id.

" Therefore, I support the proposals for copyright reform offered in the literature which
suggest that courts "[o]ught to determine whether this taken thing was itself taken by the

plaintiff from the cultural tradition known to those in the field." John Shepard Wiley, Jr.,
Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 119, 184 (1991).
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3. The Method of Copying. A second indicium that copyright is
more closely modeled as a market-based harm rather than a pure
property right in relation to a text is that the genuine focus of the
infringement analysis examines the method of copying rather than
the thing alleged to have been copied. Unlike patent law, a

copyright plaintiff carries, as part of his or herprima facie case, the
burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the defendant did not
independently create the accused work (i.e., without copying from
the plaintiffs work). More specifically, the copyright plaintiff must
show that the defendant copied from the plaintiffs work. Proof of
copying then permits the fact finder to infer that the accused
infringer substantially reduced his overall cost of expression (i.e.,
cost of creating the work). This allows the infringer to set a price
below the plaintiffs marginal cost, since the infringer has a lower
cost of expression to recoup. This is the true sine qua non of
copyright infringement; without this, then regardless of the
quantitative extent of copying, infringement is rarely found, as we
shall see. Indeed, a thorough review of the case law reveals an
astonishingly low correlation between the frequency of infringement
verdicts and the quantity of protectable expression taken from the
first work.7 This observation alone suggests an alternate criteria

" The skeptical reader is invited to compare the following sets of cases. See, e.g., cases
comprising a "low-copying" group in which infringement was found, Robert R. Jones Assocs.,
Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274,8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
builder of custom homes was entitled to the lost profits it would have received had the
infringer not duplicated the design); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 684 (2d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that the test for whether photographs of a ballet
constitute infringement was whether the photographs were substantially similar and not
whether the ballet could be reproduced); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503
F. Supp. 1137, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the clip of a Charlie
Chaplin compilation shown on the news at his death was a copyright infringement); Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686,182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (granting an injunction against the publishers of a child psychology book because of
clear and convincing proof of plagiarism); Hedeman Prods. Corp. v. Tap-Rite Prods. Corp.,
228 F. Supp. 630, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381 (D. N.J. 1964); Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Inc. v.
Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (granting an injunction
against the party which published a set of solutions to a copyrighted physics text book);
Warren v. White & Wykoff Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (holding that the use of
historical text from a book as captions for a calender, though verbatim copying, was for a
different purpose and for a compilation, thus damages were small). But see cases comprising
a 'high-copying" group in which infringement was not found, Worth v. Selchow & Righter
Co., 827 F.2d 569, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no copyright
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by which copyright infringement is actually determined.
Therefore, liability for copyright infringement is premised on the
method by which the accused infringer created his or her text,
rather than on the amount of protectable expression common to
both texts. In other words, if the accused infringer's text is
identical to a prior one, it still does not infringe the prior text
unless the accused text was derived from the prior text. This is not
an affirmative defense to a charge of infringement, but the chief
component of the plaintiffs prima facie case. This principle is
impossible to reconcile with a regime granting a property right in
expression embodied in a text.
Consider in contrast the test for patent infringement: "To
establish infringement, every limitation set forth in a patent claim
must be found in the accused product or process. ... "7 This test
provides a sterile, highly analytical process which requires
painstaking dissection of the terms comprising the claims in the
patent. By contrast, consider a few exemplary formulations of the
copyright infringement standard:
It is certainly not necessary to constitute an invasion
of copyright, that the whole of a work should be
copied, or even a large portion of it, in form or in
substance. If so much is taken, that.., the labors
of the original author are substantially to an injuri-

infringement though the designers of a trivia game had used the content of the plaintiffs
book and some verbatim copying of uncopyrightable materials); Hoehling v. Universal City

Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that there was
no copyright protection in an authors historical account unless there was wholesale copying);
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 387 (2d Cir.
1976) (reasoning that a copyrighted children's book was not infringed by a magazine with
a similar story because the "total feel" of the two works was different); Affiliated Hosp.
Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that where a game was in the public domain, the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
copyrighted rulebook in preparing the defendant's rule books did not constitute copyright
information); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 150 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 715 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that the publication of the book did not damage the
publisher of a magazine article about a celebrity); Barris/Fraser Enter. v. Goodson-Todman
Enter. Ltd., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that whether a television
game show format was substantially similar so as to be infringing was a question of a fact).
7 'Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
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ous extent appropriated by another that is sufficient
to constitute a piracy pro tante.7 5
Taking what is in essence the heart of the work is
considered a taking of a substantial nature, even if
what is actually taken is less than extensive.76
Appropriation of the fruits of another's labor and
skill in order to publish a rival work without the
expenditure of the time and effort required for the
independently arrived at result is copyright infringement.7 7
And finally, from Arnstein v. Porter, perhaps the most important
decision in copyright law: "[t]he question, therefore, is whether
defendant took from plaintiffs works so much of what is pleasing
to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom
such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."78 What
these excerpts illustrate is that, first, copyright infringement is
premised on the method by which the accused infringer prepared
his or her work, rather than the amount of protectable material
copied; and second, the analysis rapidly distills to a fundamental
matter of fairness.
And indeed, the copyright infringement test appears to have
always been this way. A review of the 19th century copyright cases
reveals an unmistakable fixation upon copying, which is offered to
corroborate the conclusion presented in the previous section-that
the method by which the accused infringer created his or her work
is the center of gravity of the infringement analysis, and not the
quantitative measure of the material taken. Consider how one
court in 1845 phrased the infringement test: "[T]he real question
7

' Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (emphasis added).
76 WPOW, Inc. v. MRJL Enters., 584 F. Supp. 132, 136, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502, 505

(D.D.C. 1984).
"Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690, 182 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 609,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (quoting Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 120 (2d
Cir.7 81962)).
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1946).
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on this point is, not whether such resemblances exists, but whether
these resemblances are purely accidental and undesigned, and
unborrowed, because arising from common sources accessible to
both the authors."79 A few years later in 1858, another court,
relying upon the leading copyright treatise, framed the infringement test this way:
[T]he main question is, whether the author of the
work alleged to be a piracy has resorted to the
original sources alike open to him and to all writers,
or whether he has adopted and used the plan of the
work which it is alleged he has infringed, without
resorting to the other sources from which he had a
right to borrow.'
Finally, at about that same time (1862), a Federal court in Ohio
posed the question essentially the same way:
[T]he true inquiry undoubtedly is, not whether the
one is a facsimile of the other, but whether there is
such a substantial identity as fairly to justify the
inference that in getting up the guide, Mrs. Ewing
has availed herself of Mrs. Drury's chart and has
borrowed from it its essential characteristics.8 '
So, compared with patent law and trademark law, the most
distinctive feature of copyright law is that the copyright infringement plaintiff must affirmatively disprove independent creation by
the accused infringer.
4. The Ordinary Observer and Fair Use Tests. Finally, the
ultimate infringement decision is left-in the case of fiction works
anyway-to the "ordinary observer" who, after a deliberately
unanalytical review of the two texts, condemns the latter as an
infringement if it appears to him to have been derived from the
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
8o Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763).
8'Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4,095). See also Haas
7

v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Hand, J.) (setting forth analogous
reasoning to determine the existence of a copyright violation).
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former text. This is a peculiar way to enforce a property right that
resides in a text. In the case of patents for instance, the accused
device and the relevant patent claim are compared, element by
element. The overall similarity between the device and the claim
is irrelevant; instead, what matters is whether every element
comprising the claim is present in the accused device. Only then
does the similarity become infringement. By contrast, copyright
law deliberately eschews a piecemeal analysis of the two texts, in
favor of the fact finder's desultory hunch. Indeed, not only does
copyright law not rely upon an analytical comparison of the two
works, but it expressly forbids it, electing instead for the ordinary
observer's unreflective impression. If we assume that copyright
grants a property right in relation to a text, then the ordinary
observer test is among the least reliable or sensible means to
enforce it. In many instances, the ordinary observer, by his
deliberately casual inspection of the two texts, cannot possibly
determine whether one contains protectable expression borrowed
from the other (e.g., suppose one was a novel, the other a film).
But what he or she can do, is determine whether a likely consumer
will confuse the two works, believing one to be derived from the
other. The only possible rationale for this legal standard then, is
that it protects the copyright owner from harm to his or her
preferred market position-harm whose proper measure is
consumer confusion over the original and accused works. Nonfiction works are judged differently (i.e., the ordinary observer
standard is not used), though with the same result, and as we shall
see, for the same reason.
In the case of fiction works anyway, the infringement dispute is
turned over to the ordinary observer, with these data: (1) plaintiff
owns a copyright in the text at issue, which implies some minimal
level of originality; (2) though precisely in what elements of that
text the originality resides is not determined or is essentially
undeterminable; and (3) the accused infringer created his work by
copying from this text. Given this information, the ordinary
observer is instructed to render an infringement verdict if the
accused text strikes him as having been derived from the plaintiffs
text: "The test for substantial similarity is whether an average lay
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropri-
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ated from the copyrighted work."8 2 Notice that he is not asked to
perform the far simpler task: identify discrete elements of the
plaintiff's work in the accused's work. Notice also that if the fact
finder determines beforehand that the plaintiff does not own a valid
copyright, or even if it does, and the accused infringer independently created its work, then the court renders summary judgment for
the accused infringer and the ordinary observer is never invoked.
The ordinary observer test is relied upon to determine infringement in fiction works. It is not generally used to judge infringement in works of nonfiction. In this section, the standard used in
nonfiction works shall be discussed, and this Article will argue
that, though it appears very different from the ordinary observer
standard, it too, is premised on the likelihood of market harm,
rather than on an isolated comparison of the two texts. In the
alternative, this Article will argue that both the fiction works and
nonfiction works infringement standards, though superficially
distinct tests, are actually directed to the identical endpoint.
In the case of nonfiction works, in contrast to fiction works, the
precise boundaries of the protectable portion of the text are quite
often readily determined. Yet, we shall see, the infringement
analysis in these instances moves quickly away from a precise
definition of the protectable portion of the text, and quickly towards
liability based purely on market harm. Another brief digression is
needed before we go further, however.
Copyright law is deeply fissured into two domains, two distinct
bodies of law that are drastically different though, quite astonishingly, rarely discussed that way. In other words, two different legal
standards exist to judge infringement of fiction works versus works
of nonfiction. The typical infringement dispute over a nonfiction
work involves literal (verbatim) copying by the accused infringer.
The copyright plaintiff begins by identifying the discrete element(s)
copied from his work. So long as what was taken is eligible for
copyright protection, the infringement analysis per se is straightforward and proceeds quickly to the real infringement analysis-under
Kretschmer v. Warner Bros., 1994 WL 259814, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (emphasis added)
(citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 800, 801 (2d
Cir. 1966) and others). Notice that this is not unlike the 'likelihood of confusion' test in
trademark law-which is unquestionably premised on confusion of the ordinary consumer,
rather than a recognition of a property right in a particular trademark.
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the guise of the "fair use" defense, which is nothing more than a set
of disparate exceptions to excuse otherwise infringing activity.83
Under fair use, the qualitative (not quantitative) importance of the
portion taken is emphasized. Moreover, the similarity of the two
works as a whole is almost never considered important to the
infringement analysis. Complete work's similarity is only relevant
later in the fair use analysis, particularly in the last prong of the
analysis which scrutinizes the effect of the accused work on the
market for the original. In contrast, fiction works are judged as a
whole, without any particular regard to discrete elements.
For instance, consider this case which illustrates the non-fiction
standard.' In 1977, Charlie Chaplin died. Though an immensely
popular figure much earlier, Chaplin was virtually unknown to
younger film audiences. The reasons for this were that he had
spent the last twenty years of his life outside the United States
(having been forced out of the country on account of political
pressure stemming from Senator McCarthy's anticommunism
hysteria), and (perhaps in response to this) he deliberately withheld
his later films from distribution within the United States. Upon
Chaplin's death, the CBS network decided to prepare a major
television biography. Given the subject, the biography would
naturally have to include some sort of retrospective of Chaplin's
films, but it would also discuss his personal and political life. This
documentary was scheduled to air on television during prime time.
However, CBS had a slight problem. While some of Chaplin's films
were in the public domain, others were not. In fact, the owner of
the copyright in some of the films had repeatedly refused to grant
a license to CBS so that it could prepare its documentary. CBS
went ahead anyway. To prepare its approximately ninety-minute
documentary, CBS used excerpts from five of Chaplin's films whose
copyrights were owned by a third party. Together, these excerpts
comprised about nine minutes of a total of almost eight hours of
film from which the excerpts were taken. CBS's use of the
copyrighted works was no more than necessary; furthermore, the
film excerpts constituted a transformative work-i.e., they were
Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997).
" Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 580

(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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used creatively rather than imitatively to produce an entirely new
work drastically different from the plaintiffs. Moreover the CBS
documentary did not appropriate the economic value of the Chaplin

films. Despite all of this, the court found the use to be an infringement.s' The ordinary observer, however, would have pardoned
this use because the two Chaplin films when compared with the TV
biography are aesthetically different, though some variants of the

test focus upon whether the ordinary observer would recognize one
as having been derived from the other.'
In the vast majority of infringement disputes over non-fiction
works, the infringement analysis is straightforward. Typically, the
accused infringer borrows verbatim a discrete element from the
plaintiffs text, which is readily identifiable in the accused work
(e.g., a quote, or a photograph). Hence, the infringement analysis
proceeds fairly quickly toward the "real" infringement analysis:
fair use. In essence, the fair use "defense" is a second infringement

"CBS's fair use defense was rejected as well. Id. at 1147.
Perhaps the ordinary observer would condemn the TV biography, for the reason that
I suggested above, i.e., that the ordinary observer would recognize that the TV biography
was derived from the Chaplin films. Still, the most common formulation of the ordinary
observer test is not the "derived from" variant but the "would regard their aesthetic appeal
the same" one. This brings up an interesting point. Even though the TV biography is
comprised of about 90% original material and only 10% from the plaintiffs works, that 10%
is still readily recognizable within the accused work. Even when viewed as a whole, a typical
aspect of many copyright disputes over non-fiction works, the purloined material is
incorporated into the accused work in such a way that it is readily recognizable within the
accused work. This is similar to mixing gin and lime juice. Generally, though not always,
fiction cases look different. The incorporation of borrowed material (e.g., a basic sequence
of events) into the accused work is more like a chemical reaction between the borrowed
material and the new stuff. The borrowed material is no longer separately recognizable once
subsumed within the accused work; rather, it becomes an organic part of the whole. This
is similar to combining carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen to get sucrose. Hence, the ordinary
observer would overlook the borrowed material and excuse the copying. One exception
among cases involving fiction works is "character" cases, where the accused infringer creates
an entirely new work around a character (Sam Spade, Mighty Mouse) borrowed from the
original. In these instances, the borrowed element is actually recognizable within the
accused work. This might explain why these cases stand out among fiction work cases,
which generally tolerate substantial copying without infringement, while character cases do
not. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (9th
Cir. 1978) (holding that comic book characters were recognizable enough within defendants
.counter-culture" comic books to preclude summary judgment in defendant's favor) and cases
cited therein.
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test."7 Indeed, fair use is litigated far more often than the prima
facie infringement case.s8 In fact, historically, rather than being
an affirmative defense to a charge of infringement, fair use was
procedurally and substantively intertwined with the infringement
analysis; only recently have the two inquires diverged. So it
appears that the fair use doctrine (nonfiction works) and the
ordinary observer standard (fiction works) generate parallel results,
though by entirely different means.
Fair use is an enormous, and often disparate, collection of
exceptions to liability, judicially codified since 1976 in the copyright
law. By far the most important of these exceptions is 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(4): "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work."8 9 Therefore, fair use explicitly
redirects liability toward economic harm, or at least putative
economic harm, and away from an isolated determination of the
scope of protectable expression of the plaintiff's text. As evidence
of this, the doctrine of fair use has been invoked in numerous
instances to excuse even verbatim borrowing from the copyright
owner's work. For instance, in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.' the Supreme Court relied on fair use to
immunize the copying of entire television shows by home videocassette recorder (VCR) owners.91 This copying was excused on
the ground that the copying did not curtail viewer demand for the
television shows.9 2 Similarly, the Copyright Act of 1976 contains
an explicit provision to permit whole-text copying of books and
periodicals for educational purposes.9 3 This activity is immunized

' That the fair use inquiry is the 'real" infringement analysis is no secret. See, e.g.,
Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics ofthe Law: BringingSubstantialSimilarityDown to Earth,
98 Dic. L. REV. 181, 188 (1994) ("[Clourts frequently either omit or give cursory treatment
to the issue of infringement when the fair use defense is raised.'). On this, I believe

Professor Lape is quite correct. Indeed, in nineteenth-century infringement cases, fair use
was blended with the infringement analysis. Id. at 185.
*See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and EncouragementTheory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) (discussing
among other things, the trend of denying enforcement of copyright claims which conflict with
particular economic and utopian goals).

" 17 U.s.c. § 107(4) (1994).
go464 U.S. 417 (1984).
" Id at 447.
'

2

Id at 456.

3

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976); see also, S. REP. No. 94-473, at 64-65 (1975).
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Consider also Consumers Union, Inc. v.

General Signal Corp.'
There, the defendant incorporated a
verbatim excerpt from plaintiffs magazine, which recommended
defendant's product, into its advertisement.9 5 The court found this
use to be fair-again, on the ground that the demand for plaintiffs
work (i.e., that particular magazine issue) was not likely to be
suppressed by the defendant's use of the borrowed material."
VI. CONCLUSION

The Authors conclude that the First Amendment must be invoked
to resolve a conflict between the public's right to learn and
exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner. Second, the Authors
suggest that copyright law and the First Amendment are harmonized by reconceiving copyright infringement as a tort, providing
protection against demonstrable market harm, and nothing else.
I have argued that the conflict the Authors identify has been long
ago resolved. Second, I believe that the Authors have correctly
suggested that market harm should be the center of gravity of the
copyright infringement analysis. This Article simply provides
additional doctrinal justification for the result they have offered.

9

724 F.2d 1044, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 400 (2d Cir. 1983).

at 1044.
"Id. at 1051.
6Id.
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